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INTRODUCTION  
The Great Recession of 2008, which began in the US and quickly spread to Europe, was one of the most 
significant economic shocks since the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the effects quickly rippled 
around the world. Company level employment practices are heavily influenced by the macroeconomic 
environment (Boxall and Macky, 2009; Cook et.al, 2016; Mitchell and Zaidi, 1990; Zagelmeyer and 
Gollan, 2012), and economic crisis may force firms to re-evaluate their business operations to remain 
competitive or simply to ensure survival.  While businesses may respond by reducing employment 
levels through downsizing (Cooper et.al, 2012; Datta and Basuil, 2015; Dencker, 2012; Goyer et.al, 
2016; Johnstone, 2018), they may also make changes to employment practices.  Examples include 
freezing wages and bonuses, reducing overtime, diminishing opportunities of promotion, reallocating 
jobs and responsibilities, reducing expenditure on training and development, revising pension provision 
and adjusting working time (Ahlstrand, 2015; Cascio,  
2015; Gunnigle et.al, 2014; Lai et.al, 2016; Larsen and Navbjerg, 2015; Roche et.al, 2013; Strandholm 
et.al, 2013; Svalund et.al, 2013; Svalund, 2015; van Wanrooy et.al, 2013).    
Firms encountering severely depressed market conditions might implement a combination of 
employment adjustments (van Wanrooy et.al, 2013), and different approaches can be envisaged (Teague 
and Roche, 2014).  On the one hand, firms might focus primarily upon adjusting the size and 
composition of the workforce through headcount reductions.  This is an approach commonly associated 
with lightly regulated liberal market economies (Cascio, 2010).  On the other hand, firms might aim to 
mitigate job losses by utilising alternative measures to protect employment as part of a commitment to 
employment stabilisation or responsible restructuring (Cascio, 2005; 2010; 2015; Teague and Roche, 
2014).  These may include temporary lay-offs, short-time working arrangements or the redeployment 
of workers to different roles.  Firms may also maintain a buffer of temporary workers to enable the 
company to reduce headcount while protecting ‘core’ workers when market conditions decline.    Such 
approaches are normally associated with the coordinated market economies of continental Europe, 
where ‘beneficial constraints’ may promote stable employment where possible  
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(Cascio, 2010; 2015; Teague and Roche, 2014).  Thus, while we might anticipate general pressures to 
cut costs and improve efficiency in crisis hit organisations, there are many ways this can be achieved, 
with quite different consequences for both businesses and employees.  As Bacon (2008) notes, “the 
effects of market pressure on strategic choice are complex…cost pressures do force managers to act to 
reduce labour costs although such pressures are not direct measures in exactly how to act”.    
As well as the immediate responses of firms to deteriorating market conditions are questions regarding 
the potential impact upon employment practices in the medium and long term.  To what extent do 
recessions act as a ‘critical juncture’ leading to the transformation of employment practices, and if so 
what might this transformation look like?   One view is that firms might make only shortterm 
adjustments while largely maintaining the status quo (van Wanrooy et.al, 2013), while others note the 
potential for recessions to modify existing arrangements (Roche and Teague, 2014).  In their insightful 
review of the literature, Roche and Teague (2014) identify three main scenarios.  The first suggests that 
recessions can lead to the diffusion of high commitment approaches and long-term oriented investments 
in HRD and employee engagement.  This perspective seems to be implicit in some of the more popular 
and upbeat HR research (e.g. Ulrich et.al, 2010), and in the UK the recession certainly coincided with 
a decision by the government in 2008 to commission a report exploring employee engagement and its 
potential benefits for companies, employees and UK competitiveness (MacLeod and Clarke, 2009).   In 
contrast, the second view suggests that recessions might lead to the diffusion of a ‘new employment 
deal’, characterised by the increased utilisation of contingent labour, a decline in job security and the 
expansion of precarious employment (Cappelli, 1999).  Alternatively, any changes might not fit neatly 
into either of these two scenarios as in practice employers might enmesh hard and soft approaches to 
HRM, as part of a pragmatic approach to HR policy rather than one driven by a strong guiding HR 
philosophy or values (Teague and Roche, 2014).  The drivers for change may also vary, and while in 
some cases decisions might be a direct response to organisational distress, in others they might be more 
opportunistic in nature (Geoski and Gregg, 1997), perhaps as part of an attempt to improve financial 
performance and deliver greater shareholder value  (Appelbaum et.al, 2013; Thompson, 2011).  
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THE RESPONSES OF BRITISH EMPLOYERS TO THE 2008 RECESSION   
In the context of the UK, a national severely affected by the economic crisis, the latest WERS11 survey 
of British workplaces provides valuable insights into the responses of employers to the 2008 recession 
(van Wanrooy et.al, 2013).  The survey reveals that most employers (75%) made at least one 
employment related response to the challenging economic environment, and those more severely 
affected typically made several changes.  The most common adjustments included freezing and cutting 
pay (41%), freezing recruitment (28%), reorganising work (25%), and postponing expansion plans 
(22%).  Other measures included reducing overtime (19%), and adjustments to training (17%), use of 
agency staff (15%) and working hours (14%).   In terms of cutting employment levels, 10% 
organisations made compulsory redundancies and 7% made voluntary redundancies.  Though 
unemployment rose to 8%, overall employment and unemployment figures levels were remarkably 
resilient given the severity of the economic crisis, and when compared with previous recessions  
(Coulter, 2016; van Wanrooy et.al, 2013). Some 3.5 million workers were made redundant between 
2008 and 2012, equivalent to 1 in 7 employees in work at the start of the recession. However, this is 
comparable with the five years to 2000, a period of more buoyant economic conditions (Philpott, 2013), 
and the overall redundancy rate was similar in 2004 and 2011 (ONS, 2013).  Various explanations have 
been offered for the seemingly resilient employment levels (van Wanrooy et.al, 2013). Economic 
factors, including several years of strong economic conditions pre-recession, low interest rates and a 
squeeze on real pay might have provided some financial cushioning to firms.  A further explanation is 
that employers might have been eschewing downsizing and hoarding labour (Coulter, 2016; van 
Wanrooy et.al, 2013).  As Coulter (2016) states, “a possibility is that, with healthier balance sheets, 
firms responded to economic difficulty by maintaining their workforce as much as possible rather than 
engaging in short-term cost cutting”.  Relatedly, it is possible employers mitigated employment losses 
by using alternative flexible working arrangements (van Wanrooy et.al, 2013), and there were certainly 
reports of major employers including Nissan and Honda implementing short time working and 
temporary layoffs  (Kollwe, 2009).     
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Yet while have insights into the aggregate responses of British employers to the recession at a labour 
market level, we have less insight into exactly how and why particular employers responded as they did 
at the enterprise level, how different adjustments were combined, or the consequences of the approach 
taken.  Were employers favouring alternative flexibility measures to mitigate redundancies and protect 
jobs and if so what form did they take?  Such questions can be difficult to answer from large scale 
quantitative datasets like WERS (van Wanrooy et.al, 2013). Furthermore, to what extent did the 
recession act as a catalyst for the modification of existing labour flexibility practices, perhaps as part of 
an attempt to improve the future resilience of the workplace? Unfortunately, the timing of significant 
British and Irish studies in 2011/12 (Roche et.al, 2013; van Wanrooy et.al, 2013) mean they can offer 
only preliminary insights into the aftermath and legacy of the recession on work and employment 
practices. This may also partly explain why such studies tend to suggest continuity rather than change, 
while analysis of the limited case study evidence available suggests a harsher reality of restructuring, 
job cuts and the imposition of new harder HRM techniques (Cook et.al, 2016; Johnstone and Wilkinson, 
2017).  In short, our understanding of both the immediate and longer-term implications of the recession 
on employment practices remains limited.  Addressing this gap is the motivation for this paper.   
The empirical focus in an automotive parts manufacturer deeply affected by the recession but which, 
like many British employers, did not make large scale redundancies.  In contrast to existing case studies 
which have investigated the implications of recession upon HRM or employment relations strategies 
more broadly (Cook et.al, 2016; Johnstone and Wilkinson, 2017; Roche and Teague, 2014), the primary 
focus is upon exploring the ‘flexible labour model’ espoused by the employer, and believed to be central 
to the organisations ability to manage through turbulent times. Two main themes guided the empirical 
inquiry:   
(1) How and why did the organisation use labour flexibility strategies to navigate recession, and 
what were the consequences of the approach taken?     
(2) What was the legacy of the recession and were existing labour flexibility strategies modified or 
transformed post-recession?    
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The paper makes several contributions.  Empirically, it provides rare insights at the enterprise level into 
how an organisation heavily affected by the economic downturn navigated the recession.  Such issues 
have received limited attention in the existing literature (Teague and Roche, 2014).  A qualitative case 
study approach allowed the study to probe how and why particular labour flexibility strategies were 
implemented, as well as how they were combined and perceived by actors.  The timing of the fieldwork 
in the period 2014/15, though not longitudinal, allowed analysis of how the crisis unfolded over a period 
of years during both crisis and recovery. It therefore offers valuable insights into the legacy of the 
recession.  A further strength is inclusion of worker perspectives which is much-needed in HRM 
research. Conceptually, the study contributes to ongoing debates in this journal and elsewhere regarding 
employment practices in turbulent times, (Ahlstrand, 2015; Larsen and Navjberg, 2015; Roche et.al, 
2015; Svalund, 2015), as well as broader debates regarding labour flexibility and the impact of economic 
cycles on employment (Dekker and van der Veen, 2015; Preenen et.al, 2015; Roche and Teague, 2014; 
Teague and Roche, 2014). The remainder of the article is structured as followed.  The next sections 
present the conceptual background and research methods.  We then present a case study of automotive 
parts manufacturer – referred to by the pseudonym AutoParts – to the Great Recession of 2008.   We 
then discuss the findings and implications before drawing some conclusions.    
RECESSIONS AND LABOUR FLEXIBLITY  
The ability of an organisation to respond a sudden shock, such as a recession, can be thought of as a test 
of flexibility, defined by Meulders and Wilkin (1987) as “the capacity to adjust to change”.  In much 
mainstream management research flexibility is viewed as a virtue associated with successful 
organisations (Blyton, 1996; Legge, 1995).  Our key concern is labour flexibility, and such concerns 
have a long history as the use of overtime and casual workers confirms (Blyton, 1996);  arguably the 
notion of more stable employment arrangements with a single employer only emerged around the time 
of industrialisation (Cappelli, 1999).  In recent decades, academic discussions of labour flexibility have 
been influenced by the ‘flexible firm’ model proposed by Atkinson and colleagues in the 1980s 
(Atkinson, 1984; Atkinson and Meager, 1986).  In simple terms, the model suggested that labour 
flexibility can be achieved by segmenting a ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ workforce.  Core employees are 
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those with valuable firm-specific skills and are viewed as assets to be developed and retained.  They 
will be offered good pay, training, career development opportunities and employment security.  In 
return, these workers will be multi-skilled and must be flexible in the tasks they carry out (functional 
flexibility).  The core is encircled by ‘peripheral’ workers with more generic skills and who have more 
limited employment security.  These workers provide organisations with the opportunity to adjust the 
number of employees to match their requirements (numerical flexibility).  In times of low demand then, 
we might expect the redeployment of core workers to other tasks and the disposal of peripheral workers.    
However, the Atkinson ‘flexible firm model’ has been widely criticised (Hyman, 1991; Pollert, 1991; 
Procter et.al, 1994).  It was also unclear whether Atkinson was trying to describe, predict or prescribe a 
model of a ‘flexible firm’ (Marchington et.al, 2016).  The generic nature of the model means it does not 
consider potentially important contextual factors such as management strategy, work organisation, 
production techniques or the drivers for labour flexibility. One motivation for flexibility is to allow 
firms to adapt to temporary changes in demand, also known as ‘capacity flexibility’ (Håkansson and 
Isidorsson, 2003).  Håkansson and Isidorsson suggest that in manufacturing contexts, there have been 
important developments in production operations such as the shift towards lean production which aims 
to minimise inventory, buffers and stock.  They argue that this approach leaves manufacturers highly 
exposed to fluctuations in demand, and that the ability to adjust production volume often requires 
flexible labour. Building upon Atkinson (1984), they propose three main forms of flexibility: numerical; 
working time and functional flexibility (See Table 1).  In times of high demand, a firm may hire more 
workers on a temporary or permanent basis depending upon the anticipated duration of increased 
demand (numerical flexibility).  They may also increase the hours for workers (working time flexibility) 
or reorganise roles to help meet production demand (functional flexibility).  Conversely, in times of low 
demand, firms may reduce the size of their workforce temporarily or permanently (numerical 
flexibility), reduce working hours (working time flexibility), or reallocate staff to different roles 
(functional flexibility). The approach taken is likely to depend upon context.  
Numerical flexibility is perhaps more appropriate where jobs require only a short job introduction, while 
the feasibility of working time variations may depend upon job design.  Functional flexibility might 
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require different demand patterns to be feasible.  In terms of consequences, flexibility strategies allow 
firms to rationalise production, reduce slack, and manage peaks and troughs in demand.  For workers, 
however, the removal of slack might mean work intensification, and potentially also the segmentation 
of the workforce into different groups with different employment arrangements.   We use this 
framework to guide our assessment of labour flexibility strategies at the enterprise level in the context 
of AutoParts. a manufacturing organisation which espoused a flexible labour model, and suggest that 
this was central to its ability to managing during economic turbulence.    
  [INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]     
   
RESEARCH METHODS   
Existing quantitative studies of recessionary adjustments provide valuable cross-sectional insights into 
measures at a labour market level (van Wanrooy et.al, 2013). However, this study is concerned with 
exploring how and why organisations responded to recession as they did, and how practices evolved as 
economic conditions improved. A qualitative case study design was thus deemed most appropriate in 
helping understand the dynamics of flexibility strategies at the enterprise level and in a particular 
organisational context (Bryman and Bell 2007; Yin, 2013). As Sengupta and Edwards (2010) note, “a 
particular strength of such approaches is that they facilitate a more rounded consideration of espoused 
policies and practices than can be achieved by relying upon one-off employer statements.  It also 
provides an opportunity to explore the specific ‘meaning’ of employment practices, given the reporting 
of practices might reveal very little about how they are enacted or perceived (Cook et.al, 2016).    
In selecting a suitable case a degree of ‘purposeful sampling’ was employed, and the empirical focus is 
AutoParts, a manufacturer of components for the commercial vehicle industry. The British 
manufacturing sector was heavily affected by the 2008 recession, with around half of manufacturing 
organisations reporting a ‘significant’ impact on business while a quarter described a ‘moderate’ impact 
(van Wanrooy et.al, 2013).   At AutoParts the effect of the recession was described by senior managers 
as “sudden and deep”.   However, it was also suggested that as a private sector employer operating in 
8  
  
volatile automotive markets established flexibility strategies were already in place, and the challenging 
economic conditions can be viewed as an important test of these measures. The study draws upon 
numerous site visits, meetings and formal interviews conducted during the period 20142016, with a 
focus upon shopfloor production arrangements. The timing of the research meant that as well as insights 
on the specific adjustment measures adopted in late 2008, we obtained views on how developments had 
unfolded over time, and as the organisation recovered and subsequently grown.   
The study draws primarily upon insights from eighteen in-depth interviews.  The aim was to obtain the 
perspectives of different actors, and interviewees included senior managers, line managers, employee 
representatives and front-line production employees.  Management respondents included the Group HR 
Director, former Group HR Director, HR Manager, Site Manager, former Site Manager, Operations 
Manager and Production Manager.  Given that some people in key management positions in 2014 were 
not in the same position in 2008, access to their predecessor was also generally possible and allowed 
comparisons in perspectives to be drawn.  Other interviewees comprised supervisors, production 
operatives and members of the in-house Staff Council (AutoParts is a nonunion organisation). The 
duration of interviews ranged from one to two hours, and several respondents offered to answer any 
further questions after the interview by email or telephone.  Questions concerned changing business 
conditions, and the nature of employment practices and approaches to labour flexibility.  Interviews 
also aimed to obtain insights regarding employment arrangements prior to the recession, the use of 
labour flexibility strategies during the downturn, as well as how these have evolved since the recession.  
All interviews were recorded and transcribed to facilitate thematic analysis, and subsequently coded 
using categories which guided the design of the interview template as well as emergent and recurring 
themes raised by interviewees themselves (Lofland and Lofland, 1995.  Insights obtained during formal 
interviews were supplemented by informal interactions over lunch and coffee, and enabled the 
researcher to obtain clarification on issues.  There was also an opportunity to have a tour of the 
production facility and meet operatives and this was valuable in understanding production operations. 
Access has also been provided to relevant internal documentation including policy documents, 
presentation slides and HR data during the period under study. These allowed contextualisation and 
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triangulation of interview findings and to mitigate the risks of poor recall.   In contrast to snapshot 
studies, contact with the organisational gatekeeper and management team has been ongoing for several 
years as part of a broader research engagement. This has provided various informal and formal 
opportunities to check issues of interpretation.  As with much case study research, the findings may be 
deemed context specific, though creating statistically generalisable findings was not the motivation for 
the study. Rather, the aim was to obtain go beyond reports of labour flexibility practices and to obtain 
richer insights into how practices are implemented as well as how they evolve. Nevertheless, a degree 
of ‘analytical generalisation’ may be possible (Yin, 2013).  
 FINDINGS  
Context   
AutoParts designs and manufactures automotive components for heavy duty commercial vehicles, and 
their main customers are the manufacturers and users of trucks, buses and agricultural equipment.  The 
focus of this study is the main European production site located in Northern England.  Since production 
began at the site in the mid-1990s, the overall trajectory has been one of significant growth across 
various metrics including production, sales and employment levels.  Around 250 people work at the 
facility in both production and office based roles, and as a non-union organisation employee 
representation is provided through an internal Staff Council.   Production activity involves the assembly 
of patented automotive components and comprises two business streams.  First are ‘New Build’ 
components, supplied to original equipment manufacturers to be installed in new commercial vehicles.  
These components are assembled in production cells comprising small teams of operatives. Each cell 
can accommodate between one and five operatives depending on demand.  Demand for new 
components is highly cyclical with low demand over summer during the European holiday season, and 
very sensitive to conditions in automotive markets.  Second are ‘Aftermarket’ components which 
produce replacement components throughout the life of vehicles, and which need to be replaced at 
regular intervals. Aftermarket parts are assembled on a production line and the number of operatives 
required to operate the line at any one time is fixed.  Demand for aftermarket parts is generally more 
stable and less sensitive to the vagaries of market conditions.   Production roles in both business streams 
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can be learnt relatively quickly though it can take several months to become as efficient as an 
experienced operator.  Traditionally, the production workforce has comprised permanent AutoParts 
employees on open-ended contracts, and a ‘buffer’ of staff provided by an employment agency, a model 
believed to be typical in the automotive industry given variable market conditions.    
The impact of the recession in 2008   
Prior to the recession, the financial performance of the business had been strong for several years, and 
the site had repeatedly expanded in terms of production output and staffing numbers.  Additional 
production cells and lines had been introduced coupled with investment in new technology.  By 2007 
production output had reached record levels, and forecasts suggested that this upward trajectory would 
continue in 2008.  A senior manager recalled how the challenges experienced by some European and 
US financial organisations in the second half of 2007 had created a stir in the media and in business 
circles, but that the order book was strong and sales remained steady. Some “softening of demand” was 
reported during summer 2008, but as most European automotive manufacturers have a summer 
shutdown, it was believed to reflect the usual summer lull rather than a more fundamental change in 
market conditions.  By autumn, increased uncertainty and talk of the ‘credit crunch’ in financial markets 
raised the spectre of a downturn, though the mood was still confident.    As a Senior Manager recalled:  
“I was in a meeting in mid-September 2008, and while we had seen demand fall over the summer we 
were still okay, doing reasonably well, people were still pretty confident.  And I remember it was during 
that meeting that someone announced that Lehman Brothers had just gone bust.  And then I was 
concerned.  Really concerned. Were we about to fall off a cliff?  And I think it was within 30 days or 
so after that happening that it was quite literally a crash” (Senior Manager).         
The Operations Manager noted how in October 2008:  
“I was in my office and someone came in and asked if our systems were down as orders had disappeared.  
And when we investigated several orders had been cancelled and many others postponed until the 
following year.  And by December we didn’t know where the next order was coming from.  You’d have 
someone like TruckCo normally making 20,000 engines a month.  Well in November 2008 they sold 
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72 trucks, and we’re their main supplier.  They didn’t want anything at all from us. They had some 
inventory.  People simply stopped buying new trucks and we basically lost our New Build business. All 
businesses go into survival mode, no one is buying anything from anyone.  I thought how are we going 
to manage through this, a crash unlike anything we’ve seen before?” (Operations Manager).     
While demand for New Build components suddenly vanished, demand for Aftermarket parts is generally 
more resilient and could provide some level of cushioning during a downturn.  As the HR Manager 
explained:  
“Thankfully a chunk of our profit comes from the Aftermarket and they’re patented products.  When 
you get a service one of our parts will be put in.  And regardless of a recession you’re not going to ruin 
a fleet of £120,000 trucks by not get them serviced.  So, our Aftermarket businesses does fare a bit 
better in recessions” (HR Manager).   
By the end of 2008, and following many years of consistent growth and expansion, production output 
had fallen by 50%.  While demand for New Build products had disappeared, orders for Aftermarket 
parts meant production did not come to a complete halt.    
  
  
  
Company labour flexibility strategies in recession    
A Shift Manager explained that a workforce meeting was convened in early October 2008 to 
communicate the changing context with employees:    
“They called a big meeting and everyone was there.  They said, right, orders have nosedived and we 
need to make savings, and unfortunately the savings will mean resources.  When they say ‘resources’, 
you know they usually mean people. I really don’t like that.  I’m a not a resource, I’m a person and my 
team are not resources, they’re people and any decisions affect their livelihood” (Shift Manager).   
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The first measure announced was that all agency staff would be “released” from the business.  This was 
to have a significant impact on the size of the workforce as around one third of the production workforce 
were employed by an external employment agency.  As the business had grown rapidly in the years 
preceding the recession, many new workers were supplied by a local employment agency and agency 
workers had become common in the areas of production most sensitive to changes in production demand 
(notably Goods In, New Build, Dispatch).  This was believed to be essential because of the “feast and 
famine” nature of the New Build business which has short and unpredictable order books.  Indeed, even 
in a year of record output in New Build, it was said that this would typically comprise a mix of quiet 
months, such as summer, as well as more unpredictable periods where the business struggled to meet a 
surge in demand.   Developing a buffer of “structural temps” was believed to be a way of managing 
these “spiky demand patterns” in the areas most sensitive to changing production levels, allowing the 
business to temporarily increase and decrease the production workforce when necessary.  At peak times 
overtime would also be plentiful.  Some agency workers managed to secure permanent AutoParts 
contracts, while others had become many “long-term agency”, working on and off with AutoParts for 
some time.     
However, when the crisis hit in late 2008:  
“The tough reality was that we needed to shed all the temps.  Its’ like an insurance policy I guess.   
Yes, we pay an upfront premium for temps, and many work here a while when things are steady.  
Some might say why not just take them on then, give them a permanent contract?  But we can let agency 
workers go in an inexpensive and swift manner if and when a downturn comes.  And in this case that 
was absolutely the first thing we had to do” (Senior Manager).  
As the HR Manager explained:   
“To be honest we had way too many temps [when demand fell].  They were sweeping the floor.  
Cleaning. I sat down with every single temp and explained what was happening, that we were sorry to 
let them go, and that we’d love to have them back.  Some had been here a long time.  But I shared the 
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analytics with them, we weren’t trying dupe anyone, told them where we were coming from.  We 
explained we’d bring them back as soon as we could” (HR Manager).       
Having quickly reduced the size of the production workforce by removing all agency workers, the 
business also reduced the number of shifts from three to one meaning that all workers would now work 
a standard working week. A consequence of the reduction in shifts was that all production employees 
would no longer be entitled to the shift premia associated with alternating shift patterns.  Coupled with 
the elimination of overtime opportunities it was suggested by an Employee Representative that some 
workers viewed the changes as “a pay cut but most folk took solace in the fact they were still here, they 
had seen folk go, they were watching the news and knew that these were really bad times”.    
Most New Build workers were redeployed to help with Aftermarket production. Though some 
employees were officially ‘multi-skilled’, moving between these two areas was not normal practice and 
it was suggested that redeployed workers had to learn the skills required to work on the Aftermarket 
production line.     Managers explained that while these steps allowed the business to reduce costs, as 
the recession continued to bite further cost saving measures were deemed necessary.  Various options 
were mooted including pay cuts and short-time working. Interestingly, a decision was made to 
implement short-time working/pay cut for the senior leadership team only.  As a senior manager 
explained:     
“It was called officially called short-time working, a four-day week for the leadership team. In reality it 
was actually a form of salary sacrifice, a pay cut, because most of the senior leaders still worked 5 and 
6 days a week to try and keep the place afloat.  Of course, a 20% cut of leadership pay is going to do 
very little to the bottom line.  But it was more than that.  It was symbolic.  It allowed us to say, you 
know, we’re all in this together.  We might be management but we’re suffering too and will share the 
pain” (Senior Manager).  
However short time working and pay cuts were rejected for the production operators, and instead some 
voluntary redundancies were offered.  As the HR Manager explained:      
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“We crunched the numbers again and worked out that we still needed to lose people.  Now you can’t 
always avoid compulsory redundancies but there was a deliberate move to avoid compulsory 
redundancies by any means necessary.  People were able to enquire about what their package might be, 
no questions asked.  Our view was that we should try and let the people who want to leave go, rather 
than focusing on the role they were doing.  And to be honest if that meant long nights brainstorming 
how to sort things out then so be it” (HR Manager).  
Following extremely tough trading conditions during autumn and winter 2008/9, by Spring 2009, some 
early signs of recovery were reported in New Build. This was followed by a sudden surge for parts in 
the Aftermarket business, which was believed to reflect that as vehicle users had delayed or postponed 
upgrading their fleets, there were now many more older vehicles in use.   As the Operations Manager 
explained:    
“The orders suddenly flooded in and we quickly had a massive backlog of orders in Aftermarket. It 
annoyed the hell out of our customers and we had to do something. We put overtime on but it wasn’t 
enough.  We desperately needed extra shifts and extra shifts need more people.  So we had no choice. 
We rang the agency and put extra shifts back on. But it was a really strange position as at that point the 
leadership team were still taking their pay cut, and the corporate line was still about short-time working, 
not using agencies, no overtime.  We’d literally gone from dire straits to being short staffed!” 
(Operations Manager).    
The impact of the recession at AutoParts was described as “deep and quick” with a significant fall in 
demand during 2008 and 2009.  Aftermarket proved more resilient and cushioned the blow at the height 
of the downturn, while recovery in New Build was more gradual.  By 2011 conditions in both business 
streams had improved, and the company organised an end of year celebration to mark the recovery.  
Since this period the business has continued to grow. For the company, the flexibility strategy was 
generally viewed as successful as it allowed the business to expand and contract relatively easily in line 
with changing market conditions, and to protect the employment of a ‘core’ workforce.      
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Company labour flexibility strategies during recovery   
Yet despite broadly sanguine assessments of the way the business navigated the recession, and the 
ability adjust staffing to match production levels, it was nevertheless suggested by a senior business 
leader that:   
“Following the recession, we realised we’d really felt our way through and we really need to look at 
things differently going forward.  I think it was a wakeup call for a number of people.  There’s a lot of 
volatility out there.  This was not a one off.  We had also suffered back in 2001.  As a listed company 
on the stock exchange we report quarterly and we need to be able to manage the expectations of the 
investment community.  We must be very results focused.  We need to make sure we have the right 
processes in place” (Senior Manager).   
Since the crisis several changes in labour flexibility strategies were described in relation to staffing 
policies, workforce composition and labour utilisation.        
First, it was suggested that prior to the recession staffing levels were primarily a matter for line managers 
to decide locally, based upon production forecasts, past experience and their own judgement.  Since the 
recession it was suggested that obtaining additional staff is a more onerous process requiring new 
paperwork and various management approvals.  Besides, a new IT system means the number of 
operatives required on a day to day basis is automatically determined by a computer program.  As a 
Shift Manager explained:  
“In the past you could just ring up the agency, I want ten more people.  Now you have to plan all your 
work, you feed into an Excel spreadsheet, and it tells you straightaway how many people you need.   
Before it was much more rough cut. Based on historical data  or just how you’d always done it.  But 
maybe not the best in terms of managing costs.  We didn’t really have a handle in that in 2008. It’s 
much more data driven now.  Some says it’s dumbing down, but it’s all about controlling our costs” 
(Shift Manager).      
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Second, there have been noticeable changes in the composition of the production workforce.  Prior to 
the recession, the production workforce was segmented between permanent staff and a buffer of ‘stable 
temps’ employed by an agency who worked in the areas mostly closely affected by variable demand 
such as New Build.  They would typically account for up to one third of the production workforce at 
any one time.  However, since the recession there has been an increase in the utilisation of agency 
workers across the production floor.  As the HR Manager explained:  
“As people have left the business, we’ve generally replaced them with an agency temp, not a permanent 
person.  We still do periodic temp to perm conversions but it’s not a high number.  We need the right 
degree of flex and I’d say that’s pretty much been the last seven or so years since the recession.  From 
a business perspective it’s absolutely the thing to do” (HR Manager).   
While prior to the recession most agency staff were located in parts of the business which experienced 
peaks and troughs in demand, concerns were expressed by line managers and operatives regarding the 
new “agency culture” on the factory floor.  Respondents suggested that the use of agency workers may 
be deemed sensible in areas with volatile demand patterns, and where the work is generally team based 
and the size of the team can be adjusted to match production. However, questions were raised regarding 
the utilisation of agency workers in parts of production with steady and predictable staffing 
requirements.  As a production operative explained:  
“I think we do need to use temporary staff, but I think if it’s on the production line in Aftermarket, to 
operate a shift at all you know you need X number of people to run.  It’s a fixed number. Quite 
predictable. Shouldn’t these then be permanent positions?  You can’t run the lines if these people aren’t 
here.  If a minimum number of people are needed for the line to run I think they should be permanent” 
(Production Operative).   
As well as the increase in the proportion of agency workers and their diffusion across the shopfloor, 
there was also a notable change in how some new agency workers are now utilised.   As a production 
operative explained:  
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“We used to have two groups of worker but now we have three.  There are those with permanent 
contracts.  Then you’ve got your ‘permanent agency’ if you like, everyone knows them, they’ve been 
here for years, very skilled.  Then you’ve got your ‘temporary agency’ who just come in and out.  Now 
none of this officially exists by the way, but it’s how we see it on the shopfloor.  So if they want to make 
cuts, all those that’ve been here a month, bye!  And they will try and keep the ‘permanent agency’ 
who’ve maybe been here three or four years and are really experienced with the machines.  To be honest 
they can now cherry pick who goes and when and the last to go would be the most valued” (Production 
Operative).     
The HR Manager acknowledged that since the recession, in addition to a group of “stable temps” are a 
pool of ad hoc agency workers.  As she explained:   
“This new flexible model means I can switch labour on and off with minimal notice.  If we need a temp 
I can get one the next day because the agency have the type of people we need on their books.  Some 
have already done our basic induction, done some shifts before, and can slot right in whenever we want.  
We have flexibility on a daily, even hourly basis now; we can even send these people home if there is 
no work” (HR Manager).  
This can be contrasted with the dominant model prior to the recession when agency workers generally 
had stable and regular employment, except during occasional quieter months when they might have 
been laid off for several weeks. However, as a Senior Manager explained:  
“It’s no longer just about the ability to lay them off for a month in the summer if you like, it’s actually 
flexing during the months and weeks as we operate, and looking more and more about how we can get 
much leaner business processes, much more robust in how we work.  We really need that extra flexibility 
within the business” (Senior Manager).   
However, the new approach was widely questioned by line managers and employees as the following 
remark illustrates:  
“One week they’re in and the next week they’re not.  It’s really difficult as a temp.  You’re wondering 
when your next work is coming.  It must be difficult to run your life like that.  Folk get upset if they’re 
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not on the rota, so I try and rotate them so they all get some work and keep their skills up.  But to be 
told you are not needed today or sent home after two hours because there are no parts.  It may be a 
sound business strategy but it’s definitely not nice to people.  You could even say it’s selfish of the 
business.  To be honest I’ve never thought of it like that before” (Shift Manager).  
However, has the HR Manager concluded:  
“It’s simply something we need to do in this kind of business and at the end of the day it means we can 
protect our business and the permanent workforce going forward.  The stuff we have to do from a 
business perspective can be hard” (HR Manager).    
DISCUSSION   
How and why did the organisation use labour flexibility strategies to navigate recession and what 
were the consequences of the approach taken?  
Håkansson and Isidorsson (2003) suggest that while there are various potential drivers for labour 
flexibility, in manufacturing a major motivation is adjusting production levels to meet variable demand, 
especially as modern manufacturing techniques emphasise lean approaches which minimise inventory 
and stock.  Labour flexibility is therefore important, and they suggest this can take three main forms 
(numerical, functional and working time), and that the preferred approach is likely to depend upon 
context and can have very different consequences.  Our first objective was therefore to explore how 
employers responded to recession at the enterprise level.  We use this typology to assess how AutoParts, 
a firm severely affected by recession, utilised labour flexibility strategies to navigate the crisis.    
The study reveals how prior to the recession the business had emphasised the development of numerical 
flexibility by utilising agency workers in some of the most cyclical areas of production.  However, many 
years of strong trading conditions resulted in the development of a relatively stable agency workforce 
with regular employment, but also enabling the business to occasionally reduce the number of staff in 
quieter months.  Even when market conditions were strong and the business was expanding, there was 
an emphasis upon maintaining a level of potential numerical flexibility in case of a downturn, helping 
to reduce slack and protect the ‘core’ workforce.  This reflects the notion of ‘stable flexibility’ 
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(Håkansson et.al, 2013), whereby ‘temporary’ agency staff are increasingly used as part of a long-term 
labour management strategy rather than simply a reaction to an immediate need resulting in a cadre of 
long-term agency workers (Holst et.al, 2010; Voss et.al, 2013).  The workforce was therefore segmented 
between a ‘core’ on permanent contracts and a ‘periphery’ of (relatively stable) agency workers, some 
with quasi-permanent status.  The benefit for the business compared to a hire and fire model was that it 
allowed temporary adjustments to be made without the permanence and distress of downsizing, and this 
was deemed preferable in managing volatile automotive markets.  While in some ways this may reflect 
the segmentation approach proposed by Atkinson (1984), in stable conditions the core/periphery 
distinction was blurred, and both groups worked together and carried out the same tasks.    There was 
also little evidence of functional flexibility, while working time flexibility measures were only used in 
times of very high demand (by regularly offering overtime) rather than when demand fell.   
This emphasis on numerical flexibility meant that when the business experienced a sudden fall in 
demand in late 2008, it could quickly and easily reduce the size of the workforce by removing all agency 
staff.  However, because the impact on the two main business streams differed, there was an opportunity 
to redistribute remaining production workers who were therefore required to be functionally flexible.  
Working time adjustments were also made, including an overtime ban and the temporary 
implementation of a single shift standard working week.  Compulsory short-time working was avoided, 
presumably because the standard working week already meant a loss of shift pay for production workers 
despite working the same number of hours.   Instead, when further cost savings were sought the business 
offered a small number of voluntary redundancies (numerical flexibility) rather than imposing a 
reduction in working time (working time flexibility). The case thus reveals how the business navigated 
the recession by deploying a combination of numerical, functional and working time flexibility 
measures to achieve cost savings.  For the employer, this was viewed as a successful illustration the 
flexible labour model, and the approach taken was believed to have protected the business and ‘core’ 
employees, and allowed the business to quickly and easily make cost savings and mitigated the need for 
large scale redundancies.  It also allowed AutoParts to quickly increase production when conditions 
improved by sourcing more staff from the agency (numerical flexibility) and offering overtime (working 
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time flexibility).  For workers, the implications are less clear cut.  Most permanent staff remained in 
employment in exchange for a willingness to carry out other roles (functional flexibility) and accept 
changes to schedules which also meant a temporary reduction in pay (working time flexibility).  Agency 
workers carried most of the risk, and were laid off.  In times of crisis then, in some ways this reflects a 
core/periphery approach with agency staff providing numerical flexibility and permanent staff accepting 
functional and working time flexibility in exchange for greater job security (Atkinson, 1984). Yet while 
agency staff had less security, most of the time the core/periphery border was blurred (Hakansson et.al, 
2013), and as the case reveals, permanent workers did not have complete immunity from redundancies 
when further cost savings were sought.  A summary of the developments is provided in Table 2.  
[Table 2 about here]   
Were existing labour flexibility strategies modified or transformed post-recession?  
As well as how firms use labour flexibility strategies to navigate changing conditions are further 
important questions regarding the medium and long-term implications for employment practices.  To 
what extent do recessions act as a ‘critical juncture’ leading to the transformation of employment 
practices, and what might such transformation look like (Roche and Teague, 2014). Some of the popular 
and upbeat HR research suggests that recessions might lead to the diffusion of high commitment 
management and long-term investments in HRD and employee engagement (e.g. Ulrich et.al, 2009), 
and in the UK the economic crisis coincided with a surge of interest in raising levels of employee 
engagement and a government commissioned report on the topic (MacLeod and Clarke, 2009).  In direct 
contrast, others see the potential for recessions to act as a catalyst for a ‘new employment deal’ involving 
the increased utilisation of more contingent labour, a decline in job security and the spread of more 
precarious forms of employment (Cappelli, 1999).  Somewhere in between these two extremes is the 
suggestion that any changes might not fit neatly into either of these pure scenarios, as employers adopt 
a more ‘pick and mix’ approach enmeshing elements of soft and hard HRM practice, or that firms might 
make only short-term adjustments while largely maintaining the status quo (Roche and Teague, 2014.    
Recent labour market evidence in both the UK and Ireland certainly lends some empirical support to 
this more variegated picture (Roche et.al, 2013; Roche and  
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Teague, 2014; van Wanrooy et.al, 2013).  However, there are at least two limitations of such studies.  
First, the timing of these national level labour studies and their cross-sectional nature means they can 
only provide partial insight into the legacy of the recession on employment practices.  A further 
possibility, informed by the flexibility literature (Atkinson, 1984; Håkansson and Isidorsson, 2003), is 
that employers might be adopting more segmented approaches with the impact depending which group 
of employees are being considered.  Our second objective was therefore to assess the legacy of the 
recession at AutoParts, and to explore whether labour flexibility practices were transformed 
postrecession.  
The case reveals how the recession acted as a significant test of the labour flexibility at AutoParts, and 
as a catalyst to review labour flexibility strategies for the future.  The outcome of this management 
review was the view that while the existing strategy was appropriate, more must be done to manage 
during future periods of volatility more effectively.  As a result, at least three important changes could 
be observed post-recession.  First, there has been an emphasis upon increasing the level of numerical 
flexibility, and in practice this has involved increasing the use of agency staff in production roles. Prior 
to the recession agency staff were used in areas most sensitive to variable demand, while most workers 
in more predictable areas were permanent employees.  Since the recession, agency workers are now 
used across production and there are far fewer ‘core’ workers.  Second, staffing levels are now more 
strictly controlled and monitored.  Before the recession, line managers had discretion over staffing 
levels; now a computer system automatically determines ‘optimum’ staffing levels based which meet 
key cost/sales metrics.  Thirdly, there has also been a change in the way agency staff are used.  Prior to 
the recession, there was an identifiable ‘core’ on permanent contracts, and a periphery of agency 
workers offered relatively stable work, and the prospect of converting from ‘stable temp’ to permanent 
employee. Since the recession, however, a new group of workers have emerged and are used to offer 
numerical and working time flexibility on a weekly, daily and even hourly basis.  While this model 
might help the employer further minimise slack and reduce costs the implications for workers are less 
positive.  Rather, the post-recession employment model comprises a shrinking core of permanent 
employees, a group of ‘stable temps’ with few prospects of obtaining a permanent contract, and a new 
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group of ‘temporary temps’ with high levels of uncertainty regarding when they will work or whether 
will work at all.  A summary of developments is provided in Table 2.   
CONCLUSION  
A key finding of the research examining the impact of the 2008 recession on employment in Britain is 
that the impact on employment levels was less severe than we might have expected given the severity 
of the crisis and compared with previous recessions.  One explanation is that employers used alternative 
flexibility measures to mitigate redundancies (van Wanrooy et.al, 2013).  However, there are few studies 
which investigate how employers navigated the recession at the enterprise level, or the consequences of 
the approach taken.  Our first objective was therefore to shed much needed empirical light on this issue 
through an in-depth study of labour flexibility strategies at AutoParts, a manufacturing organisations 
heavily affected by recession, but which did not make large scale redundancies.  It reveals how in this 
case, redundancies were mitigated primarily because the organisation had a numerically flexible 
workforce predicated upon the use of agency workers. Production staff were segmented between core 
workers on open ended permanent contracts, and a sizeable contingent of agency workers with stable 
employment in buoyant conditions, but who could be released easily in a downturn.  When the crisis 
hit, the firm could quickly reduce the size of the workforce without the need to make mass redundancies 
(numerical flexibility).  Changes were then made to the job roles and working schedules of remaining 
permanent staff (functional and working time flexibility).  Thus, while the organisation avoided making 
large scale redundancies, this was not because of a commitment to an ‘employment stabilisation’ or 
‘responsible restructuring’ HR philosophy (Cascio, 2005; 2010; Teague and Roche, 2014); neither was 
it because the business hoarded labour or utilised working time flexibility measures to protect 
employment (Coulter, 2016; Teague and Roche, 2014; van Wanrooy et.al, 2013).  Rather, it reflected a 
pre-existing flexibility model which prioritised numerical flexibility through agency workers to enable 
the firm to adapt to temporary changes in demand, and enabled the business to adjust the size of the 
workforce at will.  
However, as well as how and why organisations respond as they do during challenging times, are further 
important questions regarding the impact on employment practices in the medium and long term (Roche 
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and Teague, 2014).  Our second objective was therefore to assess whether the recession acted as a 
‘critical juncture’ leading to the transformation of employment practices after the challenges of the 
economic crisis receded, and specifically whether the recession acted as a catalyst for the modification 
of existing labour flexibility arrangements.  We reveal how following the recession, and as the 
organisation recovered and subsequently expanded, the emphasis has been upon further increasing 
numerical flexibility. In addition to ‘stable agency’ workers with ongoing regular employment are a 
new group of ad hoc agency workers who provide both numerical and working time flexibility.  In other 
words, there has been both a diffusion and more intense utilisation of more market-led employment 
contracts, and a shrinking core of workers on standard employment contracts since the recession 
(Cappelli, 1999).  In practice, the production workforce has been segmented into three groups with 
different levels of certainty regarding when they will work, how long they will work for, or whether 
will work at all.   
Importantly, this has been a proactive business decision, viewed by the employer as an opportunity to 
further enhance efficiency and financial performance rather than as a response to challenging economic 
conditions (Appelbaum et.al, 2013; Geoski and Gregg, 1997; Thompson, 2011; Thompson, 2013).  
Thus, while large scale quantitative studies at a labour market level in the UK and Ireland suggested 
continuity rather than change in employment practices (Roche et.al, 2013; van Wanrooy et.al, 2013), in 
our case organisation there was clear evidence post-recession of a shift towards a more market-led 
employment model driven by short financial imperatives (Cappelli, 1999; Thompson, 2011).  Perhaps 
the timing of the fieldwork of quantitative labour market studies in 2011/12 meant they offered only 
offer partial and preliminary insights into the full aftermath of the recession.  Indeed, recent case study 
evidence suggests the impact on work has been more profound, and that in many cases the reality has 
been restructuring, work intensification, job enlargement and the imposition of harder HRM techniques.  
Interestingly, the evidence suggests that this is not just the case in sectors hardest hit by the crisis such 
as financial services (Gall, 2017), but also true in organisations more mildly affected by recession even 
in firms hitherto known from commitmentoriented HRM (Cook et.al, 2016; Johnstone and Wilkinson, 
2017).  It is therefore possible that the uncertain economic and labour market conditions since the 
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recession have given employers the opportunity to capitalise upon diminished labour market power to 
implement more hard-line HRM practices to improve firm level and financial performance metrics 
(Cook et.al, 2016; Thompson, 2011).  In line with the disconnect capitalism thesis (Thompson, 2003), 
it might be the case that even generally well-intentioned managers and employers find themselves under 
intense pressure to improve financial metrics.  The shift towards a more market-led employment model, 
viewed in our case a way to boost productivity, is one example of this.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
generalise from the experience of a single case and further studies are required to ascertain the extent 
to which the developments in our organisations might reflect a broader pattern.  There is thus significant 
scope for further studies at the labour market and enterprise level to further our understanding of the 
impact and legacy of the recession on work and employment practices in post-financial crisis Britain.    
         
                    
  
   
     
    
    
  
  
  
TABLE 1: Pre-requisites and consequences of different strategies  
Adapted from Håkansson and Isidorsson (2003)  
  Numerical (flexibility in 
the number of  
employees)  
Working  time  
(flexibility in working 
hours)  
Functional (flexibility 
in work organisation)  
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Requires  Short job introduction  Variety or enriched 
work tasks means 
extending working  
hours is easier   
Different patterns of 
demand for products 
and services  
For individuals   Increased 
intensity  
Uncertainty for t 
re work  
Risk  of  long  
insecurity   
   
work  
emps  
term  
Increased  work  
intensity  
Uncertainty as to when 
and how long  
employees will work   
Increased  work  
intensity  
Uncertainty as to where 
employee will work or 
what they will work 
with   
For workplace   Rationalisation 
production  
Segmentation 
core/periphery 
stagnation  in 
development  
of  
into  
OR 
work  
Rationalisation 
 of production  
Less turnover  
Stable workforce   
Rationalisation  of  
production   
Less turnover  
Stable workforce   
Emphasis  on  
competence 
development.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
TABLE 2: Company labour flexibility strategies at AutoParts (2008-2014)  
  Numerical   
(Flexibility in the  
Number  of  
Employees)  
Working time  
(Flexibility 
 in 
working hours)  
Functional  
(Flexibility in work 
organisation)  
Consequences 
for business  
Consequences for 
workers   
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Pre-recession  
(-2008)  
Agency staff in 
most cyclical areas 
but with regular 
and generally 
stable work. Most 
highly 
experienced. 
Allow organisation 
to flex down 
during quiet 
months by 
temporarily laying 
off agency staff 
(e.g. summer) and 
to flex up in times 
of high demand.   
‘Stable flexibility’   
Overtime  
(extended hours or 
extra shifts) 
regularly offered 
to all staff during 
busy periods.    
Limited functional 
flexibility.  Staff 
generally work in a 
particular 
production area.   
Buffer  of  
experienced 
agency 
workers.  
Ability to 
better align 
production 
demand/hours 
with staffing 
levels.   
Reduce slack.   
Control costs.  
Protect ‘core’.  
  
Segmentation  
of  workforce  
into core/periphery  
with different 
levels of  
employment 
security.  
Some  
evidence  of 
‘temp  to 
perm’.  
Some  long- 
serving ‘stable 
agency’  
workers  
unable  to  
obtain permanent 
contracts.   
  
During 
recession  
(2008/9)  
All agency staff 
removed from the 
business.   
Protection of the 
‘core’ workforce 
but nevertheless a 
small number of 
voluntary 
redundancies.   
Reduce number of 
shifts  and 
implementation of 
standard working 
week.  
Loss of shift pay.  
No reduction in 
working hours.  
Elimination  of  
overtime working.   
Short-time for 
working for 
leadership team 
only.   
Some 
 permane
nt staff 
 redeploy
ed from New Build 
to Aftermarket  
following  
downturn in New  
Build demand  
Ability to 
reduce costs by 
rapidly and  
easily reducing 
workforce 
size.  
Ability to 
reduce costs by 
eliminating 
overtime and  
shift allowance.  
Minimise 
redundancies.  
Protect ‘core’.  
All  agency 
staff leave the 
business.   
Some remaining 
permanent  
workers  
expected to carry 
out different roles.  
Remaining 
permanent staff 
 adopt  
different working  
patterns  and lose 
 shift 
allowance.   
Some  
voluntary 
redundancies for 
permanent staff.   
Recovery   Agency staff return  Overtime offered 
to all staff during  
Limited 
functionality  
Ability to scale 
up  
Some former 
agency staff  
(2009-2011)  to business.  busy periods.  
Increase  number 
of shifts.  
Return  of 
 shift 
pay.   
flexibility.  Staff 
generally work in 
same role.   
Agency  staff 
sourced  to 
 fill 
vacancies.   
workforce to 
meet rising 
production 
demand  
re-join  the 
business.   
Permanent workers  
continue in their 
new roles.   
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Post-recession  
(2011-)   
Increased use of 
agency staff across 
production.  
Re-development of 
a buffer of ‘stable 
temps’.  
Develop of a new 
layer of ‘ad hoc 
temps’ use to fine 
tune staffing 
levels.   
Overtime in times 
of peak demand.   
New group of ad 
hoc agency 
workers with no 
guaranteed hours  
provide 
daily/hourly 
flexibility.   
Limited functional 
flexibility.  Staff 
generally work in 
same role.  
Ability  to  
scale  
workforce up 
and down on a 
monthly,  
weekly, daily 
and 
 hour
ly basis.   
Further reduce 
slack.   
Further reduce 
costs.  
Further 
segmentation of 
 workfor
ce into  core,   
‘stable temps’ and 
‘ad hoc temps 
with  
varying  
degrees  of 
uncertainty.  
Limited  
evidence  of 
‘temp  to 
perm’.  
Some  long- 
serving ‘stable 
agency’  
workers  
unable  to  
obtain permanent 
contracts.  
Adhoc’ agency  
workers  
unable  to 
obtain regular 
work.    
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